In this paper we consider an overlapping generations model with endoge-nous fertility and two-sided altruism and show the limitations of applyingcommonly used open loop Nash equilibrium in characterizing equilibriumtransfers from parents to children in the form of bequest, and transfers fromchildren to parents as voluntary old-age support. Since in our model childrenare concerned with parents’ old-age consumption, agents have incentives tosave less for old age and to have more children so as to strategically inducetheir children to transfer more old-age support. We formulate such strategicbehavior within a sequential multi-stage game and use the notion of subgameperfect equilibrium to study the consequences of such strategic manipulationson private intergenerational transfers, fertility and savings decisions, and onPareto optimality of equilibrium allocation. We then examine the role ofsocial security to correct such strategic distortions.